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Transnational Public-Private Partnerships in International Relations:  
Making Sense of Concepts, Research Frameworks and Results
Marco Schäferhoff/Sabine Campe/Christopher Kaan
Abstract
Transnational public-private partnerships have become a popular theme in International Re-
lations (IR) research. Such partnerships constitute a hybrid type of governance, in which non-
state actors co-govern along with state actors for the provision of public goods, and thereby 
adopt governance functions that have formerly been the sole authority of sovereign states. 
Their recent proliferation is an expression of the contemporary reconfiguration of authority 
in world politics that poses essential questions on the effectiveness and the legitimacy of 
global governance. Significant issues are at stake concerning whether transnational public-
private partnerships can in fact deliver public goods in an effective and legitimate way. This 
article surveys the literature with regard to three central issues: It addresses the questions why 
transnational public-private partnerships emerge, under which conditions they are effective, 
and under which conditions they are legitimate governance instruments. The article demon-
strates that, at present, research on transnational public-private partnerships is theoretically 
under-informed and suffers from poor research designs. As is pointed out in the course of 
the article, future research on transnational public-private partnerships could benefit from 
well-known IR theories on international institutions, from compliance theories in particular. 
Applying these IR theories to partnerships opens up the possibility for the systematic com-
parative research that is necessary to obtain conclusive knowledge about transnational public-
private partnerships. 
Zusammenfassung
Transnationale öffentlich-private Steuerungsformen (public-private partnerships) haben sich 
zu einem bedeutenden Forschungsgegenstand der politikwissenschaftlichen Teildisziplin 
Internationale Beziehungen entwickelt. Transnationale Partnerschaften stellen eine hybri-
de Form von transnationaler Governance dar, bei der nicht-staatliche Akteure zur Herstel-
lung von öffentlichen Gütern direkt in politische Steuerungsprozesse einbezogen werden 
und Steuerungsfunktionen übernehmen, die vorher in der alleinigen Autorität souveräner 
Staaten gewesen sind. Öffentlich-private Partnerschaften werfen zentrale Fragen bezüglich 
der Effektivität und Legitimität von Global Governance auf. In diesem Arbeitspapier wird die 
Literatur über transnationale Partnerschaften im Hinblick auf drei zentrale Fragestellungen 
untersucht. Zunächst werden die Entstehungsbedingungen von transnationalen Partner-
schaften beleuchtet. Daran anschließend wird diskutiert, ob und unter welchen Bedingungen 
transnationale Partnerschaften effektive Governance-Instrumente sind. Schließlich wird die 
Literatur auf die Fragen hin analysiert, ob und inwieweit öffentlich-private Partnerschaften 
legitime Governance-Formen darstellen. Wie die Diskussion der gegenwärtigen Forschung 
zeigt, mangelt es an theoriegeleiteten Vergleichsstudien. Der Artikel zeigt, dass die Forschung 
zu transnationalen Partnerschaften von Theorien zu internationalen Institutionen, insbeson-
dere von compliance-Theorien, profitieren kann. 
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1. Introducing transnational public-private partnerships1 
Transnational public-private partnerships (PPPs) have become a research topic of central im-
portance for the discipline of International Relations (IR). These transnational institutions 
constitute a hybrid type of governance, in which non-state actors, such as transnational corpo-
rations (TNCs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), co-govern along with state actors 
and adopt governance functions that have formerly been the sole authority of sovereign states.2 
Transnational partnerships are therefore understood as an expression of the ongoing recon-
figuration	of	authority	in	world	politics,	and	reflect	that	“the	state	is	no	longer	the	sole,	or	in	
some instances even the principle, source of authority” (Hall/Biersteker 2002: 5). Over the past 
decade,	the	number	of	transnational	PPPs	has	risen	significantly,	and	today	one	can	find	them	
in almost all policy areas (Broadwater/Kaul 2005: 5).3 Yet opinion is deeply divided on what the 
emergence of partnerships means for governance beyond the nation-state. Many, scholars and 
practitioners alike, consider PPPs as a response to both state- and market-failure, and argue 
that	PPPs	improve	the	effectiveness	and	legitimacy	of	governance	in	a	globalizing	world	(Rei-
nicke/Deng 2000: 20). Others, on the contrary, criticize partnerships for being an instance of the 
‘privatization of world politics’, and claim that partnerships mainly serve business interests but 
not the public good (Brühl et al. 2001). As these diverging perspectives on partnerships indicate, 
significant	issues	are	at	stake	in	the	question	of	whether	transnational	PPPs	can	in	fact	deliver	
public	goods	in	an	effective	and	legitimate	way.	Yet,	instead	of	ascribing	transnational	partner-
ships	a	priori	the	status	of	effective	and	legitimate	governance	tools,	or,	at	the	other	extreme,	
dismissing them out of hand, we argue that transnational partnerships need careful examina-
tion. In this article, we survey the literature on transnational public-private partnerships with 
regard	to	three	central	research	questions.	First,	we	ask	why	transnational	partnerships	emerge.	
Second,	we	address	the	question	under	which	conditions	PPPs	are	effective	governance	tools.	
Third, we ask if and to what extent PPPs are legitimate forms of governance. 
We	start	off	with	the	crucial	issue	of	defining	transnational	PPPs	in	the	first	section	of	this	arti-
cle.	Many	definitions	of	the	term	‘transnational	public-private	partnership’	can	be	found	in	the	
literature,	which	makes	it	difficult	to	compare	the	outcomes	of	studies.	Such	being	the	case,	we	
discuss	the	PPP	definitions	that	we	have	found,	and	by	doing	this,	deduce	our	own	definition	
that we regard as appropriate for further analytical research on transnational PPPs. We then 
briefly	 recapitulate	 the	 lively	 debate	 on	 transnational	 partnerships	 and	point	 out	 that	 fairly	
strong arguments were not always backed by empirical evidence. 
1 This article is an outcome of the Research Project D1 ‘Transnational Public Private Partnership for 
Environment, Health, and Social Rights’, which is part of the Research Center ‘Governance in Areas 
of Limited Statehood’ (http://www.sfb-governance.de/ppp). We thank Marianne Beisheim, Anna Holz-
scheiter, Markus Lederer, Ursula Lehmkuhl, Andrea Liese, Thomas Risse, Cornelia Ulbert, Zeljko Bra-
novic, Anke Draude, Torben Heinze, Nicole Helmerich and Cord Schmelzle for helpful comments on 
earlier versions of this article.
	 Transnational	Relations	are	defined	as	“regular	interactions	across	national	boundaries	when	at	least	
one	actor	is	a	non-state	agent“	(Keohane/Nye	1971:	xii).
3 See Reinicke/Deng (2000); Esty/Ivanova (2002); Ivanova (2003); Witte et al. (2003); Bailes (2004); Witte/
Reinicke	(005);	Broadwater/Kaul	(005);	Utting/Zammit	(006);	Buse/Harmer	(007).
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In	section	two,	we	then	present	theoretical	approaches	and	empirical	findings	relating	to	the	
question	of	why	transnational	public-private	partnerships	emerge.	Since	PPPs	are	geared	to	the	
provision of public goods, understanding their formation is essential. Scholars have brought 
up a number of arguments to explain the emergence of partnerships, which we present in 
the course of this section and verify to what extent these arguments are matched by empirical 
evidence.	In	this	context,	we	also	point	out	that	research	on	transnational	PPPs	could	benefit	
from studies on national public-private partnerships (Rosenau Vaillancourt 2000). By applying 
institutional economics, these studies were able to further specify the conditions under which 
actors have incentives to form PPPs. This account may also add to a better understanding about 
the emergence of transnational PPPs.    
In	the	third	section,	we	survey	the	PPP	literature	in	terms	of	effectiveness.	With	reference	to	
Oran	Young	(00:	14),	we	refer	to	two	concepts	of	effectiveness,	simple	performance	and	com-
plex performance. While simple performance relates to the contributions that an institution 
makes	to	solve	a	specific	problem,	complex	performance	is	a	broader	concept	that	also	takes	
unintended	 side-effects	 into	 account.	As	we	 stress	 in	 the	 article,	partnerships	 can	be	highly	
effective	in	terms	of	simple	performance,	but	could	have	serious	unintended	side-effects	that	
offset	their	achievements	and	hinder	effective	global	governance.	With	regard	to	effective	sim-
ple	performance,	the	literature	points	to	the	significance	of	the	institutional	design,	but	most	
studies	fail	to	reflect	this	argument	theoretically.	Peter	Utting	and	Ann	Zammit	have	recently	
stated	that	contemporary	PPP	research	lacks	“robust	analytical	frameworks	(...)	to	make	useful	
comparisons or draw practical conclusions” (Utting/Zammit 2006: iv). We also see the urgent 
need for theory-based comparative research on transnational partnerships, but on the other 
hand, we argue that the PPP literature has largely ignored well-known IR theories. Applying 
theories of international institutions and compliance theories on transnational PPPs opens the 
possibility for systematic comparative research (Beisheim et al. 2005: 4-5). In other words, IR 
theory	offers	the	requested	theoretical	frameworks	to	shed	light	on	the	conditions	under	which	
partnerships	are	effective	governance	tools.		
In section four, we examine studies that have concentrated on the legitimacy of PPPs. Transna-
tional	partnerships	raise	crucial	questions	of	legitimacy	because	„unelected“	non-state	actors	
are directly involved in political steering. While political science as a discipline lacks a coherent 
theory of legitimate global governance, IR literature points to three mechanisms through which 
the legitimacy of global governance can be enhanced, namely, inclusiveness, accountability and 
deliberation	(Dingwerth	007:	1).	We	will	use	these	three	concepts	as	a	framework	to	present	
the	empirical	findings	from	the	PPP	literature	in	a	systematic	way.		
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1.1. Defining transnational public-private partnerships
Transnational public-private partnerships are debated as hybrid governance forms through 
which	the	political	authority	of	non-state	actors	has	extended.	 Instead	of	 influencing	global	
governance through lobbying, non-state actors are directly involved in political steering, and 
co-govern along with state actors. Yet the phenomena labeled transnational public-private part-
nerships range from loose cooperation forms to legally binding contracts for the implementa-
tion	of	specific	projects.	Partnerships	contribute	to	agenda	setting,	policy	implementation	and	
formulation, and deal with a range of issues, such as climate change, biodiversity protection, 
health, corporate social responsibility, and humanitarian aid (Reinicke/Deng 2000; Broadwater/
Kaul 2005; Benner et al. 2005).4	Such	being	the	case,	it	is	difficult	to	describe	the	population	of	
transnational PPPs. A data base including all PPPs has not been established so far. According to 
Broadwater and Kaul, there are at least 400 partnerships – compared to 50 in the 1980s–, addres-
sing	 global	 challenges,	 such	 as	 the	 control	 of	 communicable	 diseases	 and	 the	 fight	 against	
climate change or poverty (Broadwater/Kaul 2005: 6). Yet, as highlighted by the authors, their 
data base is far from extensive, and has, for instance, not incorporated most of the roughly 300 
„Type	“	partnerships,	which	were	launched	at	the	World	Summit	on	Sustainable	Development	
(WSSD) to address the implementation of the WSSD principles (Hale/Mauzerall 2004; Ando-
nova/Levy 2003). Several studies estimate that almost 100 partnerships emerged alone in the 
health sector in the last few years (Utting/Zammit 2006: 14; Carlson 2004), though there is one 
study	that	applies	a	narrow	PPP	definition,	and	therefore	counts	only	3	global	health	partner-
ships	(Buse/Harmer	007:	60).5 This variance illustrates the crucial fact that the term transnati-
onal	public-private	partnership	is	not	clear-cut,	and	that,	depending	on	the	definition,	different	
scholars	find	a	different	„universe“	of	PPPs.	As	a	commonly	accepted	definition	of	 the	term	
has not emerged yet, and as a clear understanding of the meaning of the term is lacking, the 
comparability	of	empirical	studies	is	low.	For	this	reason,	we	will	discuss	PPP	definitions	from	
the	literature,	and	thereby	deduce	our	own	definition	of	transnational	PPPs,	which	we	regard	as	
appropriate	for	future	analytical	research.	As	we	discuss	in	the	following,	PPP	definitions	can	be	
comprised	of	three	criteria,	namely,	actors,	goals,	and	provisions	for	cost-benefit	sharing.	
First,	 the	bottom	 line	of	 all	definitions	 is	 that	 transnational	public-private	partnerships	 are	
continuing and relatively institutionalized transboundary interactions, which include public 
actors, such as governments and international organizations, and private actors. However, de-
finitions	differ	on	the	term	private	actor.	One	group	of	authors	opts	for	a	broad	understan-
ding of this term, and includes both business and civil society organizations (Nelson 2002: 46; 
Utting/Zammit	006:	1;	Börzel/Risse	005:	198).	A	second	group	applies	a	narrower	definition,	
referring	to	for-profit	organizations	only,	which	means	that	the	participation	of	a	for-profit	ac-
tor	becomes	a	definitional	criterion	for	transnational	PPPs	(Bull/McNeill	007:	6;	Buse/Harmer	
4 Tesner, for instance, sees four functions of PPPs, stating that they are active in policy formulation, awa-
reness	raising	and	advocacy,	fundraising,	and	the	execution	of	project	and	operations	(Tesner	000:	7;	
see	also	Reinicke/Deng	000:	-55;	Börzel/Risse	005:	198-199;	Bull/McNeill	007:	1-0).
5	 Buse	and	Harmer	count	only	initiatives	that	have	a	public	actor	and	a	for-profit	actor	in	a	decision-
making	body	(Buse/Harmer	007:	59).		
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007:	59;	Broadwater/Kaul	005).	While	the	latter	group	of	authors	usually	fails	to	justify	why	
the	inclusion	of	for-profit	actors	is	conceptualized	as	a	definitional	criterion	for	PPPs,	a	broad	
understanding	of	the	term	private	actor	is	grounded	in	governance	theory.	From	a	theoreti-
cal	perspective,	it	can	be	argued	that	it	makes	no	difference	whether	for-profit	or	civil	society	
organizations are involved in political steering processes of partnerships. As theorized in the 
governance debate, the traditional hierarchical relationship between government actors as ‘sub-
jects	of	control’	and	private	actors	as	 ‘objects	of	control’	 is	diminishing.	Both	 for-profit	and	
civil society organizations, which were formerly simply seen as rule-targets, are increasingly 
involved in the formulation and implementation of rules (Mayntz 2006: 15; Rhodes 1996: 660). 
Following	this	line	of	argument,	we	understand	the	term	private	actor	in	its	broad	sense.	Along	
with	state	actors,	partnerships	can	therefore	be	comprised	of	for-profit	and/or	civil	society	or-
ganizations. 
The second criterion relates to the goals of transnational PPPs. The majority of studies ar-
gue that PPPs aim at the provision of public goods, while malevolent cooperation forms, such 
as	 terrorist	networks	or	 the	mafia,	 are	excluded	 from	definitions	 for	 the	simple	 reason	 that	 
these	networks	are	not	delivering	public	goods	but	public	bads	(Beisheim	et	al.	007:	37;	Utting	
2002).6 This concentration on public good provision corresponds with the broader perspective 
of governance research. Governance, as pointed out by Mayntz, refers to the various collective 
modes of regulating social matters, which means that it inherently entails a perspective on 
solving collective problems (Mayntz 2006: 15-16). In accordance with the literature, we would 
argue that transnational partnerships formally intend to deliver public goods. On the other 
hand,	we	reject	the	claim	that	PPPs	have	to	be	effective	and	successful	in	fulfilling	this	task,	
because	definitions	of	partnerships	become	problematic	when	effectiveness	standards	become	
a	definitional	criterion.	If	an	institution	only	qualifies	as	a	partnership	when	it	“is	a	mutually	
beneficial	agreement”	(Tesner	000:	7)	–	meaning	if	it	effectively	furthers	the	interests	of	all	
participating	actors	–,	failing	partnerships	are	excluded	by	definition.	Such	definitions	are	trou-
bling, because they constitute circular arguments, which impede research designs that aim at 
analyzing	the	effectiveness	of	transnational	partnerships.	This	problem	was	already	discussed	
in	the	research	on	international	regimes	fifteen	years	ago	(Hasenclever	et.	al.	1997:	15).	In	the	
regime	literature,	one	group	of	authors	argued	for	a	regime	definition	that	includes	the	attri-
bute	of	„rule	effectiveness“.	For	a	regime	to	exist,	it	was	required	that	its	members	comply	with	
its	rules,	at	least	to	a	minimal	degree.	Yet,	these	definitions	were	criticized	for	methodological	
reasons. As pointed out by Keohane, it is problematic to base the acknowledgement of a regime 
on	the	empirical	observation	of	rule	effectiveness,	as	“the	usual	order	of	scientific	investigati-
on, in which description, and descriptive inference, precede explanation” is inverted (Keohane 
1993:	8).	While	research	“would	be	for	ever	stuck	at	the	first	level:	identifying	the	phenomenon	
to be studied (…), the key theoretical issue – the relationship, if any, between regimes and state 
behavior	–	would	become	a	definitional	question”	(Keohane	1993:	8).	In	other	words,	if	rule-
effectiveness	becomes	a	part	of	the	definition,	a	regime	–	by	definition	–	cannot	be	ineffective,	
which	averts	a	non-tautological	examination	of	a	regimes’	effectiveness.	The	same	applies	to	
6	 Public	bads	are	defined	as	activities	that	cause	public	disutility	(Kaul	et	al.	1999:	6).
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transnational partnerships. Studies that examine PPPs as catalysts for the provision of public 
goods have to separate ‘cause’ – a partnership between public and private actors, based on a for-
mal	agreement	to	provide	public	goods	–	and	‘effect’,	the	concrete	provision	of	the	public	good.	
For	this	reason,	we	opt	for	a	PPP	definition	that	refers	to	the	formal	goal	of	providing	public	
goods	but	that	does	not	imply	any	effectiveness	standards.	Otherwise,	failing	partnerships	are	
excluded	by	definition,	and	studies	that	aim	to	examine	the	effectiveness	of	partnerships	are	
precluded.	Instead	of	being	part	of	the	definition,	we	regard	to	what	extent	a	partnership	proves	
to	be	effective	as	a	central	research	question.	
Definitions	of	transnational	partnerships	can	finally	elaborate	on	how	the	responsibilities	as	
well	as	the	costs	and	benefits	should	be	distributed	among	the	participating	actors.	Such	defi-
nitions	can	include	broad	statements	about	the	responsibilities	of	actors,	or	very	specific	cost-
sharing	provisions.	Nelson,	for	instance,	states	that	the	participating	actors	should	“share	risks,	
responsibilities,	resources,	competences	and	benefits”	(Nelson	00:	46).	The	World	Bank	asks	
“all		parties	[to]	commit	[…]	resources	(financial,	technical	or	personal)	to	agreed	activities,	with	
a clear division of responsibilities and distinct accountabilities for achieving those goals” (ci-
ted	in	Tesner	000:	71).	The	assertion	that	responsibilities	and	contributions	should	be	shared	
among the partners, however, is a normative presumption, which should be avoided from the 
angle of analytical research. Rather, it is up to empirical research to study if and to what extent 
contributions	are	equitably	shared	among	the	different	partners.	For	this	reason,	it	is	better	to	
exclude	statements	about	shared	responsibilities	from	the	definition.	Additional	to	these	broad	
statements,	there	are	also	definitions	that	refer	to	the	concrete	handling	and	management	of	
projects,	 and	 feature	 specific	 ratios	 for	 cost-and-benefit	 sharing.	The	German	 development	
agency	GTZ,	for	example,	requires	business	partners	to	account	for	at	least	50	percent	of	the	
project costs (GTZ 2005).7	Although	such	definitions	make	sense	for	practitioners,	for	academic	
purposes,	it	is	not	useful	to	apply	too	detailed	definitions	to	the	analysis	of	transnational	PPPs.	
The	institutional	designs	of	the	different	arrangement	are	very	diverse	and	cannot	be	captured	
with	such	detailed	provisions	on	costs	and	benefits.	
To sum up, transnational PPPs are continuous and relatively institutionalized transboundary 
interactions between public and private actors that formally strive for the provision of public 
goods,	whereas	private	actors	can	be	for-profit	and/or	civil	society	organizations.	Measures	of	
effectiveness	or	success	are	not	part	of	the	definition,	because	this	excludes	failing	partnerships	
and	averts	research	on	the	effectiveness	of	PPPs.	To	avoid	normative	stances,	and	because	of	
the	wide	diversity	of	PPPs,	the	sharing	of	responsibilities	as	well	as	of	costs	and	benefits	is	also	
excluded	from	the	definition.	We	therefore	define	transnational	public-private	partnerships	as	
institutionalized transboundary interactions between public and private actors, which aim at the provision 
of public goods. 
7	 GTZ	stands	for	„Deutsche	Gesellschaft	für	Technische	Zusammenarbeit“.
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1.2. Debating transnational public-private partnerships
The academic discourse on transnational PPPs can be denoted as fairly polarized. One domi-
nant strand within the PPP literature understands transnational PPPs as policy networks which 
strive for solving collective problems through the pooling of resources, skills, and expertise. 
Reinicke and Deng argue that partnerships respond to the mutual interests of the public and 
the	private	 sector,	 and	 as	 a	 result,	 create	win-win	 situations:	“Trisectoral	networks	have	 the	
potential to pull diverse groups and resources together and address issues that no one sector 
can resolve by itself ” (Reinicke/Deng 2000: 3). Partnerships are therefore, as we point out in the 
course of this article, believed to enhance the problem-solving capacity and the legitimacy of 
transnational	governance	(Benner	et	al.	005:	70).	In	an	increasingly	interdependent	world,	it	
is assumed that PPPs are multiplayered and multilayered governance coalitions geared toward 
joint problem-solving instead of adversarial interest representation. Authors argue that PPPs 
open	room	for	ad	hoc	coalitions	of	self-interested	agents,	are	based	on	a	decentralized	flexible	
network	structure,	and	have	a	strong	focus	on	specific	governance	problems	(Andonova	006:	
4).	Studies	from	the	field	of	New	Public	Management	also	underline	that	partnerships	foster	
the	efficiency	of	development	assistance	(Bangura/Larbi	006).	From	this	angle,	PPPs	can	pro-
vide	services	more	efficiently	to	the	poor	than	governments,	since	they	foster	the	build	up	of	in-
frastructure, and help to encourage entrepreneurship and competition in developing countries 
(UNDP 2004: 6). Overall, proponents see PPPs as a response to both state- and market failure.     
On the contrary, an opposing group of authors maintains that transnational partnerships are 
a	phenomenon	that	reflects	the	„privatization	of	world	politics“	(Brühl	et	al.	001;	004).	From	
this perspective, partnerships serve particularly transnational corporations as the main propo-
nents of the neoliberal paradigm. These authors disbelieve that partnerships promote sustai-
nable development because of the doubt that developing countries share mutual interests with 
the corporate sector. As it is unlikely that win-win-solutions can be realized, partnerships will 
not promote but hinder development processes and further deepen the North-South divide 
(Richter 2003; Zammit 2003; Utting 2002; Whitman 2002). In particular with regard to the UN 
system, these authors claim that partnerships change the power-relationship between the cor-
porate sector and the UN organizations and special agencies in favor of business. Corporations 
are	increasingly	gaining	a	significant,	yet	disturbing	impact	on	the	policy	priorities	of	govern-
mental agencies, something that in the worst case might even lead to agency capture (Ollila 
2003; Beigbeder 2004; Utting/Zammit 2006). 
As	this	short	discussion	shows,	the	academic	discourse	on	transnational	partnerships	is	quite	
polarized.	But	instead	of	ascribing	partnerships	a	priori	the	status	of	effective	and	legitimate	
governance tools, or, at the other extreme, dismissing them out of hand, we argue that transna-
tional	partnerships	need	careful	examination.	As	we	will	demonstrate	in	the	subsequent	sec-
tions, the research program on PPPs is still in an early stage. Currently, it is by no means clear 
why	partnerships	emerge,	and	if	they	can	tackle	global	problems	effectively	and	legitimately.	In	
the following we will thus track the results research has brought up in terms of the emergence, 
effectiveness	and	legitimacy	of	transnational	partnerships.	
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2. On the emergence of transnational public-private partnerships
The emergence of transnational PPPs has been examined from several well-known theoretical 
perspectives within the discipline of IR. By applying a neo-Gramscian approach, one group 
of authors asserts that partnerships are a political strategy through which business aims to 
secure	corporate	hegemony	 (Levy/Newell	00:	84;	Utting	00:	6;	Blowfield	005).	Partner-
ships emerge because corporations want to respond to the pressure from the anti-globalization 
movement by proactively accommodating oppositional claims, whereas this behavior occurs 
out of the interest to stabilize the hegemonic capitalist worldview and to reproduce a corpo-
rate-friendly global governance system (Utting 2002: 5).8 Constructivist authors, on the contrary, 
argue that a new ‘global public domain’ is emerging, which is constituted by the interaction of 
state and non-state actors (Ruggie 2004: 519). The production of public goods is, from this angle, 
no longer the responsibility of state actors alone but is increasingly accomplished within this 
new institutional arena in which non-state actors – NGOs and companies – have accepted re-
sponsibility for the provision of public goods. This argument is based on constructivist ontolo-
gy, because corporations and NGOs are perceived as norm-guided actors that respond to the ex-
pectations generated in this new institutional arena (Ruggie 2004: 519). Although constructivist 
and neo-Gramscian approaches are increasingly debated in order to account for the emergence 
of transnational partnerships, systematic studies that support these arguments are very limited. 
At the moment, the majority of work in the PPP literature refers either to a functionalist expla-
nation, or explains the formation of partnerships through incentives of individual actors. 
A functionalist argument in the IR literature claims that new forms of governance generally, 
and transnational PPPs in particular, emerge because there is a functional demand for them. 
Authors purport that contemporary globalization processes cause complex transboundary pro-
blems,	which	create	a	demand	for	effective	governance	tools	to	tackle	these	issues	(Reinicke/
Deng	000:	7;	Rosenau	00).	Since	state	actors	have	failed	to	address	these	challenges,	partner-
ships emerge as an innovative instrument better suited to target them. One author, for exam-
ple,	asserts	that	against	the	backdrop	of	globalization,	state	actors	are	overburdened	and	“can	
no longer do it alone” (Nelson 2002: 15). Another study predicates that state-actors encounter 
an	“operational	 gap”,	 and	 are	 incapable	 of	 effectively	 implementing	policies	 (Reinicke/Deng	
2000: 2). These authors suggest that state actors form transnational PPPs, because changing 
socio-economic structures force them to explore alternative instruments of policy making 
(Peters/Pierre	1998:	7).	This	argument	is	essentially	based	on	a	functionalist	logic:	changing	
structures	create	governance	gaps,	and	as	a	result,	a	demand	for	state	actors	to	form	an	effective	
response. Various studies have contested this functionalist explanation. A study on the WSSD 
partnerships reveals that these PPPs cannot be found in areas where institutional failure and 
governance gaps are exceptionally pronounced, but rather in areas in which partnerships cor-
respond with the interests and capacities of northern donors and international organizations 
(Andonova/Levy 2003: 25). The WSSD partnerships are therefore not demand-driven but sup-
8	 Similarly,	and	by	drawing	on	Foucault’s	concept	of	power,	Blowfield	argues	that	PPPs	restrict	the	ran-
ge	of	possible	discourses	to	categories	favoring	business	interests	(Blowfield	005:	18;	Barnett/Duval	
2005: 60).
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ply-driven,	as	they	reflect	the	interests	of	powerful	northern	actors	but	fail	to	incorporate	the	
needs of developing countries. Another study, which concentrates on partnerships initiated by 
the German development agency GTZ, comes to a similar result by showing that these partner-
ships were mainly located in those developing countries that are attractive to business, but not 
in countries that have the greatest demand for innovative governance arrangements (Hoering 
003:	).	These	studies	underline	that	functionalist	explanations	suffer	from	a	logical	fallacy	in	
their argumentation, as the examined partnerships did not emerge to close governance gaps 
but	to	advance	the	interests	of	specific	actors	(Andonova	006:	8).9  
Apart	from	this	functional	explanation,	much	of	the	work	in	the	literature	applies	a	different	
perspective and explains the emergence of partnerships with reference to incentives (Witte/
Reinicke 2005: 23).10 Partnerships are understood as institutions through which rational actors 
try to maximize their utilities and strive for an exchange of resources that they would not have 
access	to	otherwise.	In	contrast	to	functionalist	explanations,	„incentive-“	or	„interest-based“	
approaches are actor-centered in that they explain the emergence of institutions through the 
intentional behavior of actors. Instead of claiming that changing global governance structures 
create the necessity for actors to form alternative governance instruments, the starting point for 
interest-based	approaches	is	the	rational	actor	that	strives	for	benefits.	Many	writings	on	trans-
national PPPs have referred to this argument, sketching out the interests of international orga-
nizations, TNCs, NGOs, and governments to participate in PPPs. With regard to international 
organizations, studies typically highlight that international organizations enter partnerships 
for additional resources (Bull et al. 2004: 483; Tesner 2000: 150). The crisis of publicly funded 
development	cooperation,	particularly	the	perceived	financial	crisis	of	the	United	Nations,	has	
aggravated the trend to partner with business. Studies indicate that international organizations 
are increasingly confronted with highly technical issues for which they lack expertise, while 
business often has the skills and resources necessary to deal with today’s development challen-
ges (Witte/Reinicke 2005: 46). Business in turn participates in PPPs to receive access to public 
tenders. Public subsidies can reduce the costs for research and development – especially in the 
case	of	costly	innovations	–	and	may	lower	training	and	credit	costs.	Furthermore,	corporations	
can	gain	new	knowledge	and	reputational	benefits	for	improving	their	public	image	(Andono-
va/Levy 2003: 21; UNIDO 2002: 5). Another incentive for corporations is the access to and the 
development of new markets (Witte/Reinicke 2005: 34). As the market for CO2 emissions certi-
ficates	within	the	framework	of	the	Clean	Development	Mechanism	under	the	Kyoto	Protocol	
illustrates, completely new markets can be created through partnerships. With regard to NGOs, 
studies argue that NGOs have a general interest to participate, as partnerships open room for 
influencing	 global	 politics.	Other	 incentives	 for	NGOs	 can	 be	 greater	 publicity,	 and	finally,	
the close contact to state-actors and business actors can also result in more consultancy work 
and	service	delivery	contracts	(Dingwerth	004:	78;	Andonova/Levy	003:	1).	Governments	have	
incentives to enter partnerships, since the control over the formulation and implementation 
9 The post hoc ergo propter hoc	fallacy	of	functional	explanations	denotes	a	process	in	which	“institutions	
may be interpreted as having arisen because of the functions they must have served, when they in fact 
appeared for purely adventitious reasons” (Keohane 1984: 81).
10 See Ruggie (2002); Andonova/Levy (2003); Dingwerth (2004); Andonova (2006).  
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of policies could possibly be increased through PPPs, and because governments can also be 
interested in the expertise and capabilities of non-state actors.  
Though many IR accounts on transnational partnerships apply such an ‘interest-based’ ap-
proach, and state that the incentives of self-interested actors are a major driver for the emer-
gence of PPPs, it can be argued that research on national public-private partnerships has al-
ready	 further	 specified	 the	conditions	 for	 the	 formation	of	PPPs.11 By applying institutional 
economics to the analysis of national PPPs, scholars were in particular able to show which 
conditions favor the foundation of national partnerships through governments (Eggers 2004). 
As	this	approach	therefore	addresses	the	question	under	which	conditions	public-private	part-
nerships are most likely formed, this account may also add to a better understanding of why 
transnational partnerships emerge. In the following, we introduce three arguments from in-
stitutional economics, which, from our point of view, can also be applied to transnational PPPs 
(Mühlenkamp 2004). 
First,	the	literature	on	PPPs	at	the	national	level	argues	that	public	actors	enter	PPPs	because	
the cooperation with private partners forces them to overcome bureaucratic procedures and 
to	base	their	actions	on	economic	thinking	that	can	increase	their	efficiency	(Eggers	004:	4).	
Through the participation in PPPs, public organizations are forced to replace general goals, 
such	as	„public	welfare“,	with	measurable	targets.	This	occurs	because	corporate	partners	face	
strong economic incentives to realize returns on their investments, and will push the public 
actor	to	establish	clear	targets,	which	leads	to	a	more	efficient	mode	of	operation.	Second,	state	
actors will join partnerships with private actors if the latter have the expertise and capabilities 
necessary to implement projects, but which are not owned by the public sector. The building 
up	of	necessary	capabilities	is	a	risky	endeavor	for	state	actors,	which	can	therefore	benefit	from	
forming a PPP, because they can outsource the risk induced by a project (Eggers 2004: 65). Third, 
if	an	externalization	of	tasks	would	have	positive	effects	on	the	efficiency	but	is	politically	un-
desired,	PPPs	offer	the	possibility	for	state	actors	to	contract	out	the	task	without	losing	control	
over the provision of services (Eggers 2004: 65). Yet, as the establishment of PPPs may induce 
high transaction costs, the decision of governments or intergovernmental organizations can 
further depend on an assessment whether these transaction costs outweigh the advantages of a 
PPP (Mühlenkamp 2004: 20). Taken together, new institutional economics has the potential to 
add to the explanations of why transnational PPPs emerge. 
To	sum	up	the	section,	it	can	be	stated	that	different	theoretical	approaches	have	been	applied	
to transnational partnerships, but nevertheless, there is still a lot of room for empirical research 
to examine the conditions which favor the emergence of PPPs. As the literature review has 
shown, the popular functionalist explanation has already been contested by empirical studies. 
Additionally, many accounts assume that transnational PPPs will most likely emerge when ac-
tors	face	the	incentive	to	realize	specific	resources	they	would	otherwise	not	obtain.	As	we	have	
11 On national PPPs, see Rosenau Vaillancourt (2000); Osborne (2000).
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argued in this context, the assumptions of institutional economics that have already been ap-
plied to national PPPs can also be fruitful for the analysis of transnational PPPs.  
3. On the effectiveness of transnational public-private partnerships 
In	this	section,	we	review	the	PPP	literature	in	terms	of	effectiveness.	Following	Oran	Young,	
we	will	refer	to	two	concepts	of	effectiveness,	namely,	simple	performance	and	complex	perfor-
mance (Young 2002: 14-15). While the concept of simple performance relates to the contribu-
tions	that	an	institution	makes	to	solve	a	specific	problem,	complex	performance	is	a	broader	
concept	that	also	takes	unintended	side-effects	into	account.	In	the	research	on	international	
regimes, from which these two concepts come, most of the thinking has concentrated on the 
evaluation	of	simple	performance,	say,	for	instance,	the	effective	solution	of	an	environmental	
problem. But an institution that scores high in relation to simple performance can create ne-
gative	repercussions	outside	its	primary	issue	area	that	offset	its	contributions,	or	even	make	
things	worse.	We	will	 therefore	keep	an	eye	on	 the	findings	of	 the	complex	performance	of	
transnational PPPs as well.  
At	first,	we	survey	the	PPP	literature	in	terms	of	simple	performance.	Analogous	to	the	litera-
ture on international regimes, much scholarly attention has been directed toward assessing 
the	simple	performance	of	partnerships	and	the	factors	that	determine	their	effectiveness.	In	
order to provide a systematic overview, we will discuss the literature along the two dimensions 
of policy formulation (3.1.) and policy implementation (3.2.).12 To exemplify the core arguments, 
the	findings	on	the	simple	performance	of	PPPs	in	terms	of	policy	formulation	will	be	illus-
trated by an example from the environmental sector, namely, the World Commission on Dams, 
while	the	effectiveness	in	terms	of	policy	implementation	will	be	surveyed	in	relation	to	the	
implementation of CSR norms, with a special focus on the United Nation’s Global Compact. 
Thus,	when	we	use	the	term	effectiveness	in	these	two	sections,	we	speak	about	effectiveness	in	
the sense of simple performance. We will then focus on complex performance (3.3). Although 
partnerships are intended to supplement rather than replace the policy formulation and imple-
mentation	efforts	of	state	actors,	they	may	have	serious,	unintentional	side-effects,	which	could	
even distort the policies of state-actors. In other words, even when single partnerships are high-
ly	effective	regarding	their	simple	performance,	they	could	have	unintentional	side-effects	that	
may	hinder	effective	global	governance.	This	aspect	is	captured	through	the	concept	of	complex	
performance. To illustrate, this aspect will mainly be discussed in the context of development 
and global health politics. 
12 Policy formulation and implementation are the two central stages of the policy cycle, which usually 
comprises the four phases of agenda setting, policy formulation, policy implementation and policy 
evaluation	(Jann/Wegrich	003:	7).	
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3.1. Simple performance of transnational PPPs in terms of policy formulation
The	first	purpose	of	partnerships	is	the	development	of	norms	and	policies.	One	often	quoted	
example is the World Commission on Dams (WCD), which was created as a trisectoral initiative 
to generate standards for the construction, operation and shut-down of large dams. While the 
construction and operation of dams was perceived as a major cause of social, environmental, 
and economic problems, international guidelines in order to facilitate the success of dam pro-
jects	and	to	evaluate	the	„development	effectiveness“	of	dams	had	been	lacking.13	In	1997,	the	
World	Bank	initiated	the	WCD	to	develop	international	guidelines	to	answer	the	question	un-
der which conditions the international community should assist dam-projects (Khagram 1999: 
7).	As	the	guidelines	were	only	finalized	in	000,	it	is	too	early	to	assess	whether	the	WCD	stan-
dards	have	been	effective	for	the	encouragement	of	sustainable	development.	Nevertheless,	this	
transnational	policy	formulation	process	is	regarded	as	effective,	because	the	WCD	guidelines	
are considered as an important informal framework to which governments, international or-
ganizations, operating corporations, and NGOs refer as a discursive frame of reference in their 
day-to-day	work.	Furthermore,	the	European	parliament	has	referred	to	the	WCD	standards,	
stating	that	large	dams	built	according	to	the	WCD	guidelines	may	qualify	for	the	European	
emissions	trading	scheme	and	the	Kyoto	protocol’s	flexible	mechanisms	(Dingwerth	007:	5;	
Khagram 2004).14
Advocates of partnerships point to the WCD as a prime example of transnational norm-setting, 
which	confirms	the	commonly	held	assumption	that	the	most	effective	standards	are	ones	that	
are generated by initiatives comprising multiple stakeholders (Reinicke/Deng 2000: 19; Brin-
kerhoff	00:	1301;	Goulet	005:	88).	And	in	fact,	 the	WCD	has	managed	to	mobilize	a	 large	
spectrum of interests and included representatives of both the pro-dam lobby and the anti-dam 
movement (Khagram 1999: 8). The literature points to three arguments as to why the inclusion 
of	a	broad	range	of	actors	increases	the	effectiveness	of	partnerships	in	terms	of	policy-formu-
lation.	First,	 the	inclusion	of	many	stakeholders	brings	in	the	“necessary	technical,	regional,	
social,	and	political	information”	into	the	process	of	policy	generation	(Brinkerhoff	00:	1301).	
Hence, advocates assert that pooling resources will increase the problem-solving capacity of 
governance.15 Second, authors claim that the inclusion of norm-targets in the norm-setting 
process	increases	the	likelihood	of	compliance	with	norms:	“The	entire	[norm-setting]	process	
was predicated on the participation of all stakeholders and representation of their interests 
in order to attain ownership of the process outcomes and eventual compliance with its out-
comes”	(Brinkerhoff	00:	1301).	Scholars	argue	that	a	perception	of	ownership	leads	to	more	
effective	regulations,	and	later	on,	to	stronger	compliance	with	the	generated	rules	(Bernstein	
13	“The	WCD	is	a	pioneering	effort	to	explore	new	ways	to	formulate	global	public	policy	in	an	incre-
asingly	complex,	potentially	conflictive	world”	(Brinkerhoff	00:	130;	see	also	Reinicke/Deng	000;	
Khagram	1999;	004).	See	Dingwerth	(007:	5-99)	for	a	more	critical	and	differentiated	perspective	on	
the WCD.
14	Dams	are	major	energy	providers	and	are	therefore	relevant	for	efforts	to	reduce	CO	emissions.
15 See also Reinicke/Deng (2000); Nelson (2002); Ruggie (2002); Witte/Reinicke (2005); Benner et al. (2005); 
Andonova (2006).
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2005: 151). Third, scholars assume that the network structure of transnational partnerships can 
provide ample room for deliberation (Risse 2000: 15). Proponents of deliberation argue that 
such	‘arguing’	processes	can	foster	effective	regulations,	because	they	emerge	from	a	reasoned	
consensus rather than a bargained compromise (Risse 2000: 15).16 These theoretical arguments 
are matched by empirical studies on the WCD, which argue that the WCD has established a 
constructive	dialogue	with	a	high	quality	of	deliberation,	resulting	in	the	development	of	a	con-
sensual	knowledge	base	about	large	dams	(Brinkerhoff	00:	130;	Dingwerth	007:	95).	From	
this angle, the deliberation process was crucial in creating a consensus on core principles for 
the future development and evaluation of dams. All in all, advocates argue that the WCD was 
effective	 in	 terms	of	policy	 formulation,	 because	 it	 included	 a	wide	 range	of	 self-interested	
stakeholders	(Khagram	1999).	This	finding	also	confirms	the	argument	that	the	narrow	focus	
of partnerships is an advantage, as it is argued that PPPs break complex governance issues into 
more	specific	tasks,	which	are	easier	to	handle	(Reinicke/Deng	000:	8;	Andonova	006).			
Transnational partnerships are therefore seen by some authors as governance instruments that 
are superior to traditional international regimes (Reinicke/Deng 2000: xvi). Since this is a strong 
argument, it has to be highlighted that the supporting empirical evidence is limited. Currently, 
it	is	rather	unclear	if	partnerships	are	in	fact	effective	in	terms	of	policy	formulation,	or	even	
more	effective	than	inter-state	regimes.	This	research	gap,	at	least	in	part,	originates	from	me-
thodological reasons, because advocates often focus on successful cases but fail to incorporate 
ineffective	initiatives	in	their	research	sample	(Witte/Reinicke	005;	Reinicke/Deng	000;	Nel-
son 2002). This case selection can generate biased results (Beisheim et al. 2005: 2). Including 
private actors in the policy formulation process can also lead to lowest common denominator 
solutions	that	are	ineffective	in	order	to	solve	global	problems.	This	occurs	because	those	who	
have to bear the costs of compliance take part in the policy formulation process, and try to wea-
ken	the	regulations	(Börzel/Risse	005:	10).	As	demonstrated	by	Fritz	Scharpf,	a	large	number	
of participating actors can cause high transaction costs, and may also create serious coordinati-
on	problems	(Scharpf	1997:	70).	In	sum,	from	our	point	of	view,	it	is	still	an	open	research	que-
stion if the inclusion of private actors fosters policy formulation processes through knowledge 
provision	and	the	generation	of	ownership,	or	if	there	is	a	trade-off	between	the	participation	
of	a	wide	range	of	actors	and,	on	the	other	hand,	the	effectiveness	of	regulations.	
3.2. Simple performance of transnational PPPs in terms of policy implementation 
Norm and policy implementation is a second crucial function of transnational public-private 
partnerships. Transnational partnerships are discussed as governance tools to tackle the im-
plementation gap of international politics, which is considered by many scholars as the real 
challenge	in	world	politics	(Kell	005:	74).	Partnerships	are	therefore	discussed	as	a	tool	to	im-
plement international commitments such as the Millennium Development Goals, the Agenda 
16 See Risse (2000) for the distinction between the modes of ‘arguing’ and ‘bargaining’. See also Section 
4.4.
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21, or the Dublin Principles that were generated to foster sustainable development (Nelson 
2002; Hale/Mauzerall 2004; Conca 2005). Various studies point to examples of partnerships that 
have	effectively	fostered	the	implementation	of	international	agreements,	but	there	is	evidence	
of	fairly	ineffective	partnerships	as	well.	Studies	on	transnational	health	partnerships,	for	in-
stance,	reveal	that	some	of	them,	like	the	GAVI	Alliance,	have	effectively	contributed	to	the	im-
plementation	of	the	Millennium	Development	Goals	(Lu	et	al.	006a:	483;	Buse/Harmer	007:	
76;	Caines	005:	5).17 Many of the WSSD partnerships, however, are estimated to be inactive 
and	ineffective	(Bäckstrand	006:	303;	Pallemaerts	003:	75).	To	explain	the	diverging	effective-
ness of transnational partnerships, PPP literature entails a central argument that refers to the 
significance	of	the	institutional	design	of	partnerships.18 In the following, we discuss this argu-
ment from the literature in relation to the implementation of CSR norms, with a special focus 
on a very well known PPP, the United Nation’s Global Compact.  
Aside from the implementation of intergovernmental norms and agreements, public-private 
partnerships are debated in the corporate social responsibility literature as an instrument to 
govern the behaviour of corporations for the improvement of workplace or environmental con-
ditions (Utting 2002: 2; O’Rourke 2006).19 Corporate social responsibility denotes that corpo-
rations have to account for the social and environmental repercussions that result from their 
profit-seeking	actions.	Contrary	to	previous	CSR	debates,	which	highlighted	state	or	inter-state	
regulations, the current CSR discourse concentrates on voluntary self- or co-regulation that 
can	be	understood	as	an	alternative	or	a	functional	equivalent	to	public	forms	of	national	and	
intergovernmental governance (Utting 2002).20 In recent years, transnational multistakeholder 
initiatives emerged in response to unilateral codes of conduct set by corporations, which ten-
ded to be weak and aimed more at public relations than substantial improvements in social 
and environmental performance of corporations (Jenkins 2001: 2). Such transnational regimes, 
which express the trend that the locus of authoritative problem-solving that mainly rested with 
governments and inter-state regimes has shifted to transnational arenas, comprise multiple 
actors, and involve public-private as well as private-private actor-constellations. The United 
Nation’s Global Compact and the Global Reporting Initiative are public-private partnerships, 
while, for example, the Social Accountability International (SA 8000), the Worker Rights Consor-
tium,	and	the	Fair	Labour	Association	are	private-private	initiatives	comprised	of	for-profit	and	
civil society actors (only). 
Authors bring forward two dominant arguments to foster compliance with agreed-upon CSR 
standards.	One	 group	 of	 authors	 points	 to	 the	 significance	 of	 explicit	 performance	 criteria	
17 The GAVI Alliance is a PPP that aims at fostering immunization in developing countries (GAVI 2005).
18	See	Beisheim	et	al.	(005,	007);	Huckel	et	al.	(007);	Druce/Harmer	(004);	Bäckstrand	(006);	Andono-
va	(006,	007);	Biermann	et	al.	(007);	Witte/Reinicke	(005).		
19	CSR	literature	is	vast.	See	the	special	issues	of	World	Development	34:5,	and	International	Affairs	81:3;	
Jenkins	et	al.	(00);	Brühl	et	al.	(004);	Cragg	(005);	Follesdal/Pogge	(005);	Kolk/van	Tulder	(006a,	
2006b); Utting/Zammit (2006).  
20 Self-regulation means the institutionalized cooperation between business actors alone, whereas co-
regulation	arises	when	for-profit	actors	cooperate	with	non-profit	actors	(Pattberg	005).
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and the ability of transnational partnerships to detect and sanction non-compliant behavior 
(Nolan 2005: 459). A second group of authors emphasizes ‘softer instruments’, and refers to the 
importance of legitimacy and social learning to achieve company compliance (Ruggie 2002: 32). 
Although	both	groups	ascribe	significance	to	the	nexus	between	the	institutional	design	and	
the	effectiveness	of	partnerships,	most	scholarly	work	fails	to	reflect	these	arguments	theoreti-
cally. PPP literature could therefore gain from compliance theories developed by IR specialists 
(Beisheim et al. 2005).  
IR theory points to three modes of social control to explain why agents comply with rules: coer-
cion, self-interest, and legitimacy (Hurd 1999: 383). Coercion and self-interest rely on the ‘logic 
of	consequentialism’,	which	asserts	that	agents	are	utility	maximizers	who	engage	in	cost-be-
nefit	calculations.	Actors	who	comply	with	rules	because	of	coercion	are	motivated	by	the	fear	
of punishment from a stronger power. Coercion is the foundation of neorealist enforcement-
theory	in	compliance	literature,	which,	in	a	nutshell,	maintains	that	the	cost-benefit	calculation	
of actors has to be manipulated through (the threat of ) coercive means to achieve compliance. 
High costs of rule violations facilitate compliance; thus, credible sanctions and monitoring 
systems	increase	the	 likelihood	of	compliance	 (Downs	et	al.	1996:	379).	Compared	with	such	
a neorealist account, neoliberal IR scholars point to self-interest as a second motivation for 
compliance and assume that actors comply because of the belief that compliance fosters their 
self-interest (Keohane 1984: 65-109). Whereas coercion operates by external restraints on an ac-
tor, self-interest involves self-restraint, with actors calculating in response to putative regime 
benefits.	In	contrast	to	these	rational	choice	approaches	on	compliance,	constructivist	theorists	
assume	that	agents	comply	because	a	rule	is	perceived	as	legitimate.	Thomas	Franck	suggests	
that each norm exerts an inherent compliance pull that stems from the legitimacy derived from 
the	‘right	process’	by	which	it	was	constituted	(Franck	1990:	16).	Other	constructivist	scholars	
highlight social learning and deliberation as additional causal pathways through which actors 
comply	with	rules	(Checkel	001:	557).		
A	 significant	part	of	 the	political	 science	 literature	on	 corporate	 social	 responsibility	 corre-
sponds with either the rational choice assumptions of neorealism and neoliberalism, or the 
constructivist notions on compliance. But so far, research has failed to exploit the theoretical 
knowledge for more sophisticated research designs in which competing hypotheses are tested 
and	the	conditions	for	the	effectiveness	of	partnerships	are	specified.21	For	example,	it	is	a	con-
stantly	stated	assumption	that	transnational	institutions	are	more	effective	in	promoting	CSR	
when they create precise performance criteria, have independent monitoring at hand to watch 
company compliance, and can enforce sanctions in cases of non-compliance (Rodríguez-Gara-
vito 2005: 224).22 This assumption is very similar to the central premise of enforcement theory: 
Cases	of	non-compliance	must	be	tackled	through	coercive	sticks	to	influence	actors’	incentive	
structure.	Other	scholars	challenge	the	effectiveness	of	coercion,	indicating	that	softer	steering	
21	For	an	exception,	see	Beisheim	et	al.	(005).			
22 See Jenkins (2001); O’Rourke (2003, 2006); Kolk/van Tulder (2006a). Possible sanctions are, for example, 
the	exclusion	from	the	governance	system,	the	termination	of	contracts,	or	the	denial	of	certification	
(Rodríguez-Garavito 2005: 223).
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mechanisms	 such	 as	 social	 learning	 and	deliberative	persuasion	may	be	more	 effective	 and	
induce an incremental change on the behavior of companies (Ruggie 2002: 32). In short, both 
factions	point	to	the	importance	of	the	institutional	design	for	the	effectiveness	of	transnatio-
nal partnerships but disagree about the design features best suited to achieve compliance with 
CSR norms. 
A case in point is the United Nation’s Global Compact, which is constantly censured by critical 
scholars	and	activists	for	its	‘flawed’	institutional	set-up	that,	to	paraphrase	Chayes	and	Chayes	
(1995),	lacks	any	„teeth“	and	is	therefore	seen	as	an	opportunity	for	companies	to	bluewash	(No-
lan 2005: 459).23 Critics regard corporations as purely rational actors who will, without coercive 
regulation, only carry out actions that are in their interest. Against this, IR scholar John Ruggie, 
who was also the Special Advisor to the Secretary General on the Global Compact, indicates 
that the Global Compact was never intended to be a coercive regulatory regime but a learning 
forum	to	diffuse	best-practices	and	to	generate	policy	dialogues	on	CSR,	and	was	established	
to complement but not to substitute intergovernmental regulation (Ruggie 2002: 32). Ruggie 
underlines	the	significance	of	social	learning	and	deliberation	as	instruments	to	change	the	
behavior	of	actors,	and	argues	that	they	may	be	effective	means	to	internalize	the	principles	in	
corporations’	day-to-day	operations.	When	this	approach	proves	to	be	effective,	human	rights	
norms as well as labor and environmental standards will have become part of the cultural and 
institutional system in which corporations operate. Compliance is then self-induced, as cor-
porations comply with these norms because they perceive them as legitimate and appropriate. 
Besides this intellectual case resting on constructivist theory, the soft approach of the Global 
Compact also has to be seen against the background of some stalwart constraints, because the 
UN member states lack the political will to adopt a sweeping regulatory regime for transnatio-
nal corporations, apart from capacity and legal barriers.24 These constraints should not be disre-
garded by studies that examine the performance of the Global Compact. It is also important to 
be	aware	of	the	yardsticks	against	which	the	effects	of	the	Global	Compact	are	measured,	since	
the performance of inter-state regimes on these issues is also rather weak.   
Ian	Hurd	emphasizes	this	aspect	and	states	that	“the	Global	Compact	is	an	intriguing	piece	of	
constitutional	design”,	which	is	better	equipped	for	the	promotion	of	CSR	norms	than	tradi-
tional inter-state regimes because its institutional set-up rests upon a novel combination of 
legitimacy	and	self-interest	(Hurd	003:	111).	First	of	all,	in	line	with	Thomas	Franck’s	legitimacy	
theory, Hurd argues that the Global Compact norms possess universal legitimacy and induce a 
strong compliance pull, because they are backed by a broad international consensus and stem 
from widely accepted international agreements.25 
23	The	Global	Compact	 is	 a	major	CSR	 initiative	 launched	by	 the	 former	UN	Secretary	General	Kofi	
Annan, and encourages the adoption of ten principles, related to human rights, labor standards, envi-
ronment	and	corruption.	See	Kell	(005)	for	an	outline	of	the	Global	Compact.	For	critique,	see	Utting/
Zammit	(006);	Brühl	(007).
24	The	UN	lacks	the	capacities	to	monitor	global	supply	chains.	Furthermore	the	UN	has	only	legal	power	
over its member states but can not apply coercive sanctions on corporations (Ruggie 2002: 32).
25	From	a	pragmatic	point	of	view,	Hurd	contests	the	argument	that	broad	and	voluntary	norms	are	ge-
nerally bootless as an instrument of progressive change. He argues that minimum standards function 
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Second, Hurd highlights the role of participating NGOs as norm-entrepreneurs that pursue ex-
amples of corporate hypocrisy, engage in public shaming, or boost consumer pressures. Trans-
national advocacy coalitions, exerting pressure on corporations on the basis of the agreed-upon 
norms,	play	a	critical	 role	 for	 the	effectiveness	of	 the	Global	Compact,	because	 they	provide	
independent information about the performance of corporations that either can strengthen, or 
harm	the	credibility	of	corporations.	Consequently,	corporations	have	a	strong	self-interest	to	
comply, because they can only expect market-based rewards (since credibility may lead to incre-
ased	profit)	when	they	are	regarded	as	good	corporate	citizens.	In	other	words,	companies	face	
strong market incentives to maintain brand image when they want to remain competitive on 
the market.26 Compared to scholars who stress sticks as a mechanism to regulate partnerships, 
Hurd	indicates	that	the	carrot,	in	form	of	reputational	benefits,	may	be	a	more	effective	steering	
mechanism for changing the behavior of business. Rather than coercive regulations, compli-
ance	in	the	service	of	social	and	environmental	goals	may	be	more	effectively	achieved	through	
“the	‘soft	power’	of	public	opinion,	legitimacy	and	consumer	activism”	(Hurd	003:	108).			
This argument - though not made explicitly by Hurd - is strongly based on research by IR 
authors	who	have	proven	the	significance	of	transnational	advocacy	coalitions	for	norm	imple-
mentation and compliance in international human rights and environmental regimes (Risse et 
al.	1999;	Keck/Sikking	1998).	Such	scholars	have	specified	the	conditions	under	which	transnati-
onal networks and opposing domestic actors can induce changes toward norm implementation 
in states. Research on PPPs can gain from such insights, and produce more theoretically infor-
med studies, which could cast light on the conditions under which partnerships are successful 
and	on	 the	question	what	kind	of	 institutional	design	renders	compliance	with	CSR	norms	
more	effective.7 Related to the impact of transnational advocacy networks, it is very interesting 
to look at whether the leverage of instruments used by advocacy networks to encourage com-
pliance (like public shaming) are more striking in regards to companies than to states. States 
are still able to refer to the doctrine of sovereignty, and thus, can reject attempts to intervene in 
their	internal	affairs.28 Companies, in contrast, are not covered by such a norm, but can strongly 
be harmed by consumer boycotts, as the cases of Royal Dutch Shell and the Brent Spar oil plat-
form or the corporation’s involvement in human rights abuses in Nigeria have shown. It might 
turn out that corporations are more vulnerable targets to network pressure, because reputation 
is	an	important	source	of	profit	for	corporations,	and	hence	may	be	the	corporate	Achilles’	heel.	
Otherwise, it must also be mentioned that there are limits to the impact of consumer pressures. 
Research	indicates	that	consumer	activism	is	likely	to	be	effective	for	brand	corporations	and	
as a way to commit corporations to CSR, whereas most corporations would not submit to more explicit 
or binding regulations, and as a result, would not be open to processes of change at all (Hurd 2003).
26	See	Graham/Woods	(006:	870)	for	the	argument	that	the	brand	image	is	a	crucial	factor.
7 Rodríguez-Garavito (2005) explicitly refers to the ‘boomerang model’ of Keck and Sikkink (1998).
28 This holds true, even though the non-interference norm has eroded since the end of the cold war 
(Krasner 1999).
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those selling directly to consumers, but not for corporations that do not face the mass market, 
and	therefore	are	not	so	dependent	on	their	reputation	(Haufler	001:	70;	Sikkink	1986).29 
In	this	connection,	it	should	not	be	forgotten	that	these	are	open	research	questions,	as	we	do	
not	know	very	much	about	the	concrete	effects	of	CSR-promoting	PPPs	on	the	behavior	of	cor-
porations. A number of studies demonstrate that the implementation of CSR norms through 
PPPs can result in improvements for workers and the environment (Rodríguez-Garavito 2005: 
7),	but	the	evidence	is	mostly	illustrative	and	not	conclusive	(O’	Rourke	006:	90;	Blowfield	
005:	 179).30	 Furthermore,	 there	 is	 frequent	 evidence	 of	 anti-social	 behavior	 of	 corporations	
(Judge	000:	95;	Whitman	00).	Comparative	 studies	 that	explore	 the	effectiveness	of	CSR	
partnerships are rare. In case of the Global Compact, proponents stress that its membership 
has increased, and that it is becoming more diverse in terms of geography and economic sec-
tors	(Kell	005:	7).	However,	these	are	output	indicators	that	do	not	say	much	about	effective-
ness in terms of problem-solving (Young 1999: 99).31	A	study	conducted	at	the	request	of	the	
Global	Compact	office	by	McKinsey	&	Company	concludes	that	40	percent	of	the	corporations	
have – due to their participation – accelerated management reforms, related to the norms of 
the	Global	Compact	(McKinsey	&	Company	004:	3;	Brühl	007:	153).	For	critics,	these	findings	
underline	that	best-practice	learning	has	only	a	limited	effect	on	corporate	policy,	and	that	the	
scale	of	free-riding	corporations	is	fairly	high	(Utting/Zammit	006:	8;	Brühl	007:	154).	Other	
authors	consider	the	results	of	the	study	differently,	and	find	them	rather	encouraging	(The-
rién/Pouliot 2006: 65-66). Considering these diverging perspectives, an independent evaluation 
of	the	Global	Compact	would	be	helpful	to	receive	more	conclusive	evidence	of	its	effects	on	
corporate policies.
In sum, the institutional design of partnerships is discussed as an important factor for the 
effective	implementation	of	norms	and	policies,	but	contemporary	studies	are	rather	under-
theorized,	and	suffer	 from	methodological	problems.	The	shortcomings	of	research	on	CSR	
partnerships mirror the present stage of the research program on partnerships more general-
ly, which concentrates on hypothesis-generating instead of hypothesis-testing. To specify the 
conditions	under	which	partnerships	are	effective	governance	 instruments,	 systematic	com-
parative research that provides the opportunity to test alternative theoretical explanation is 
imperative. Theories of international institutions, such as the debated compliance theories, can 
provide	the	analytical	frameworks	necessary	to	examine	the	effectiveness	of	transnational	PPPs	
systematically (Beisheim et al. 2005: 3). 
29 It is therefore not accidental that tankers owned by brand-name corporations such as Exxon-Mobil are 
often safer than those owned by anonymous companies (Mitchell 1994).
30	For	 some	 evidence	 of	 such	 improvements,	 see	 Jeffcott/Yanz	 (000);	 Jenkins	 (001);	 Kemp	 (001);	
O’Rourke (2003; 2006); Barrientos (2005); Prieto-Carron et al. (2006).
31 This bears on David Easton’s (1965) well known distinction between output, outcome and impact 
(Young 1999).
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3.3. On the complex performance of transnational public-private partnerships  
Researchers focus commonly on individual PPPs and examine if they achieve their objectives, 
that is, simple performance. Compared with this, little research is conducted that concentrates 
on	complex	performance,	which	is	a	broader	concept	that	takes	the	unintended	side-effects	of	
institutions into account. One major concern that is raised in this context relates to the recent 
proliferation of partnerships. Some scholars argue that the emergence of partnerships could 
have serious unintended implications, because their emergence is leading to the fragmentation 
of	global	politics	and	signifies	the	abdication	of	state-actors’	responsibility	to	provide	public	
goods and foster sustainable development. Concerning the environmental sector, Pallemaerts 
criticizes	that	the	WSSD	partnerships	are	inaugurating	a	“multilateralism	à	la	carte	in	a	global	
multistakeholder bazaar”, which enables corporations to choose arrangements that serve their 
own self-interests but not the common good, and which will also reduce the political pres-
sure on state actors to create more binding regulations (Pallemaerts 2003: 286; Hale/Mauzerall 
004:	3).	Utting	presents	this	argument	for	the	field	of	CSR	more	generally,	in	which	many	
voluntary CSR partnerships have emerged that have provided a soft alternative to harder inter-
national regulations of business. As pinpointed by the author, when the UN Sub-Commission 
on	the	Promotion	and	Protection	of	Human	Rights	created	and	adopted	the	„Norms	on	the	
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard 
to	Human	Rights“,	business	lobbied	against	these	international	norms	and	explained	that	they	
were unnecessary because voluntary CSR initiatives, in particular the Global Compact, already 
existed	 (Utting	005:	 384;	Utting/Zammit	006:	7-8).	 It	has	 to	be	underlined	that	 this	 is	an	
unintended	side-effect,	as	the	Global	Compact	emphasizes	that	it	aims	at	complementing	but	
not substituting interstate regulation (Ruggie 2002: 32). Generally speaking, it can be a problem, 
when business interests use the existence of voluntary regulations provided by partnerships as 
an	argument	to	lobby	against	stricter	regulations	(Utting/Zammit	006:	7).	All	in	all,	the	rise	
of partnerships may therefore challenge the authority of state actors, especially of international 
organizations	like	the	United	Nations.	Furthermore,	partnerships	could	even	induce	a	retreat	
of state actors from the provision of essential tasks such as the regulation of the social and the 
environmental	sector	(Bäckstrand	006:	98).	While	this	assumption	has	not	yet	been	systema-
tically examined, future research should place attention on this concern. 
Other authors express related concerns about the increasing fragmentation of the global de-
velopment landscape and highlight some major problems. Since partnerships usually concen-
trate on single issues, their objectives may not overlap but distort the long-term goals of inter-
national organizations. An increasing amount of donor funds is disbursed through partner-
ships, outside of the traditional international organizations (Delcour/Vellutini 2005: 4). This 
contains the danger that the budget of the respective international organizations will be further 
reduced	and	channelled	through	PPPs	with	a	focus	on	narrowly-defined	issues.32 As a result, 
partnerships	may	undermine	 the	 efforts	of	 international	organizations	 to	 establish	 core	 in-
32	It	is	therefore	a	very	important	question	if	partnerships	will	attract	additional	development	funds,	or	
if they will rather redirect development assistance (Hale/Mauzerall 2004: 223; Delcour/Vellutini 2005).
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frastructure programs such as national health care systems, or a clean water and energy supply. 
For	 instance,	 scholars	 assert	 that	 the	 recent	proliferation	of	health	partnerships	has	 caused	
significant	changes	in	global	health	strategies,	since	the	focus	in	“global	health	interventions	
has shifted away from general preventive measures (…) towards the prevention and treatment 
of	specific	communicable	diseases”	(Lele	et	al.	005:	xi).	This	change	in	global	health	politics	
towards a few communicable diseases with cross-border spill-overs entails the risk that the 
international community will fail to build up the capacity of the health systems of developing 
countries, which is crucial because a core infrastructure is regarded as essential to sustain the 
positive	effects	of	disease	specific	partnerships	(Lele	et	al.	005:	xi).	In	other	words,	the	narrow	
focus	of	PPPs	on	specific	governance	problems	may	be	beneficial	in	terms	of	simple	perfor-
mance,	but	could	provoke	negative	side-effects,	and	thus,	could	be	dysfunctional	in	terms	of	
complex performance.
Moreover, there is the discussion that health PPPs have placed tremendous pressure on deve-
loping countries, because the fragmentation of the global development system has resulted in 
poor	coordination	and	duplication	among	aid	initiatives	(Lele	et	al.	005:	;	Buse/Harmer	007).	
There is the risk that the sheer number of PPPs can overwhelm the extremely scarce capacity 
of developing countries, as PPPs often call for the establishment of new structures or proce-
dures. Since PPPs can therefore cause high transaction costs for developing countries, who 
must address a large number of other development challenges, there is the risk that partner-
ships will slow down the progress of other donor programs, or the progress of recipient coun-
tries in general. Scholars argue that recipient countries are put under serious stress, especially 
poor countries that depend strongly on aid (Lele et al. 2005: 55). It is furthermore purported that 
this problem is further increased because the proliferation of health partnerships has challen-
ged the advisory and coordination functions of international organizations, such as the World 
Health Organization (WHO). Studies argue that the capacity of WHO is severely stretched at the 
country level and that the agency is not able to provide the necessary support for the programs 
of partnerships in recipient countries (Lele et al. 2005: xvii; Buse/Walt 2002). There is the con-
cern	that	partnerships	reflect	the	organizational	preferences	of	public	and	private	donors	rather	
than the institutional needs and capacities of developing countries, or those of the supportive 
international organizations. Partnerships particularly in the health sector are thus admonished 
to reduce transaction costs, harmonize their procedures with the other donors, and align their 
projects	with	the	country	systems	(Garrett	007:	3;	Buse/Harmer	007:	67;	Lele	et	al.	005).33
Finally,	there	are	concerns	about	the	sustainability	of	partnerships’	effects,	because	PPPs	lack	
the	permanent	authority,	long-term	financial	backing,	and	therefore	the	continuity	needed	to	
address	complex	global	problems	in	 the	 long	run	 (Forman/Segaar	006:	09).	Because	some	
major	partnerships	rest	on	the	finance	of	a	few	high-profile	philanthropic	donors	such	as	the	
Bill	and	Melinda	Gates	Foundation,	or	on	the	commitment	of	a	few	transnational	corporations,	
PPPs may be short-lived, while the need for poverty alleviation programs, clean water or drug 
and	vaccine	provision	will	persist.	One	study,	for	example,	shows	that	the	Gates	Foundation	is	
33	Yet,	studies	on	the	Global	Fund	to	Fight	AIDS,	Tuberculosis	and	Malaria	show	that	the	implementati-
on	record	of	weak	states	was	no	worse	than	the	one	of	stronger	states	(Lu	et	al.	006b;	Radelet/Siddiqi	
007).		
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the single largest donor of nine major partnerships in the health sector, entailing the danger 
that	 these	partnerships	may	simply	collapse	when	the	Gates	Foundation	stops	this	financial	
support	(Buse/Harmer	007:	67).	Cautions	about	sustainability	are	also	based	on	the	premise	
that	a	substantial	business	participation	in	partnerships	depends	on	the	question	whether	part-
nerships	are	designed	as	profitable	business	endeavors,	and	thus,	that	the	engagement	of	pro-
fit-seeking	actors	will	only	last	while	there	are	market	benefits	to	gain.	In	the	water	sector,	for	
example, some major corporations have withdrawn their investments in low-income countries, 
leaving	behind	an	infrastructural	gap,	which	might	be	difficult	to	fill	in	the	short-term	(Utting/
Zammit 2006: 26). The provision of water through partnerships can also have negative side-
effects	in	terms	of	equity,	as	the	poor	may	not	be	able	to	afford	the	services	provided	through	
PPPs	(Buse/Harmer	007:	67).
To sum up, research should not only address the simple performance of transnational partner-
ships, but should keep an eye on the complex performance of these governance instruments 
as well. The rise of transnational PPPs has surely led to a more fragmented and uncoordinated 
global arena, wherein authority is exerted by a multitude of state and non-state actors. Though 
PPPs are intended to supplement rather than replace traditional intergovernmental organiza-
tions,	and	although	some	of	them	have	already	proven	to	be	effective	governance	instruments,	
partnerships	could	have	serious	negative	side-effects	 that	might	distort	 (inter-)state	policies.	
Future	research	should	examine	this	issue.	
4. On the legitimacy of transnational public-private partnerships
In this section, we survey the PPP literature in terms of legitimacy. When we use the term legi-
timacy in the following, we refer to input	legitimacy,	which	concerns	the	participatory	quality	of	
a	decision-making	process.	Input	legitimacy	is	generated	if	actors	who	are	affected	by	a	decision	
have an input in the decision-making process. Output	legitimacy,	on	the	contrary,	refers	to	effec-
tive	problem-solving.	If	an	outcome	of	a	policy	decision	serves	the	public	good	and	is	effective	
in tackling a problem, it attains output legitimacy (Scharpf 1999: 16). Output legitimacy can thus 
compensate	for	a	deficit	in	input	legitimacy,	while,	on	the	other	hand,	low	output	legitimacy	in	
terms	of	ineffective	policies	demands	a	higher	input	from	those	affected	by	a	decision.34 Since 
the	literature	on	the	effectiveness	of	partnerships	was	already	portrayed	in	the	previous	section,	
in the following, we focus on input legitimacy. 
4.1. Discussing the legitimacy of non-state actors 
Transnational	 public-private	 partnerships	 raise	 significant	 questions	 of	 legitimacy,	 because	
non-state actors are directly involved in political steering, and thus possess a substantial in-
fluence	on	policy	making.	As	Claire	Cutler	and	her	colleagues	have	put	 it,	private	actors	are	
34 This is not to say that input legitimacy is not a virtue in itself.
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“increasingly	engaged	in	authoritative	decision-making	that	was	previously	the	prerogative	of	
sovereign states” (Cutler et al. 1999: 16; Hall/Biersteker 2002). While the emergence of transna-
tional partnerships is usually interpreted as a shift from sovereign to private authority (Bull/
McNeill	007:	),	opinion	is	deeply	divided	on	what	this	change	means	for	the	legitimacy	of	glo-
bal governance. One group of authors views partnerships as a tool to counter the participation 
gap	of	world	politics;	Reinicke	predicates	that	it	is	“immediately	obvious	that	the	involvement	
of	non-state	actors	itself	contributes	to	a	reduction	in	the	democratic	deficit”	(Reinicke	1998:	
101). Yet, this argument marginalizes the fact that the transfer of authority from elected govern-
ments to non-state actors leads to a dissolution of the division between the public and the pri-
vate sphere. As a result, the basic democratic principle of congruence between actors who make 
political	decisions	and	those	who	are	affected	by	them	is	being	increasingly	violated.	Karl	Kaiser	
argued more than 35 years ago that the growing relevance of transnational actors weakens the 
legitimacy	of	world	politics	(Kaiser	1971:	370).	TNCs	and	international	NGOs	lack	legitimization	
through elections, and this is precisely why many studies argue that their involvement in col-
lective decision-making constitutes serious accountability problems (Ottaway 2001: 265; Brühl 
007:	156).	A	skeptical	position	on	the	legitimate	governance	beyond	the	state	is	also	presented	
by Scharpf, who uses benchmarks of legitimacy that originate from domestic political systems 
for an appreciation of the legitimacy of global governance.35 Scharpf argues that input legitima-
cy is unavoidably low beyond the nation-state, because a collective identity as a precondition for 
electoral democracy is absent in world politics. Legitimacy at the global level has to be derived 
through	effective	problem-solving,	that	is,	output	legitimacy	(Scharpf	1999:	8).	
While we argue against Reinicke that the inclusion of non-state actors will by no means lead 
to an immediate reduction of the participation gap in world politics, we would likewise reject 
state-centric legitimacy concepts for the evaluation of legitimacy at the global level. Instead 
of accepting the argument that the legitimacy of global governance is inherently low, from 
our viewpoint, research should attempt to explore alternative mechanisms that strengthen the 
input	legitimacy	of	transnational	institutions,	and	ensure	that	actors	affected	by	political	de-
cisions have a say in the decision making process (Wolf 2000: 213-230; Keohane/Nye 2003: 386; 
Risse 2006). While political science lacks a coherent theory of legitimate global governance, IR 
literature points to three mechanisms through which the input legitimacy of global governance 
can	be	enhanced:	inclusiveness,	accountability,	and	deliberation	(Dingwerth	007:	38-48).36
First,	the	input	legitimacy	of	transnational	partnerships	can	be	advanced	through	the	inclusion	
of	actors	that	are	significantly	affected	by	collective	decisions	in	the	decision-making	process.	
The	scope	of	participation	relates	to	the	question	of	whether	all	affected	actors	are	included	
in	the	decision-making	processes	of	transnational	partnerships,	whereas	the	quality	of	partici-
35 Scharpf ’s study is on the supranational polity of the European Union but it should be even more va-
lid for global governance structures without supranational authority and without a global identity of 
world citizens.   
36 On transnational democracy, see Held (1995); Dryzek (1999); Keohane/Nye (2003); Held/Koenig-Archi-
bugi	(005);	Benz/Papadopoulos	(006);	Risse	(006);	Wolf	(000;	006).	See	Dingwerth	(007)	and	Bäck-
strand (2006) for applications of these concepts on transnational partnerships.
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pation	refers	to	the	question	whether	included	actors	have	equal	opportunities	to	participate.	
A second way to enhance input legitimacy is to establish accountability mechanisms. Accoun-
tability	relates	to	the	question	of	who	is	entitled	to	hold	power	wielders	accountable.	Keohane	
distinguishes between internal and external accountability; while internal accountability refers 
to authorization by principals to agents who are institutionally linked to one another – de-
mocratic governments are accountable to their citizens, corporations to their shareholders –, 
external	accountability	means	that	“organizations	are	held	accountable	not	to	those	who	dele-
gated	power	to	them,	but	to	those	affected	by	their	actions”	(Keohane	006:	79).	Accordingly,	the	
institutionalization of internal and external accountability mechanisms can enhance the input 
legitimacy of partnerships. Third, advocates of deliberative democracy argue that deliberation 
increases input legitimacy (Risse 2006: 192; Wolf 2000). Legitimacy, in a nutshell, is generated 
if	all	actors	who	are	affected	by	a	decision	participate	in	a	non-coercive	and	argumentative	pro-
cess	and	achieve	a	reasoned	consensus	instead	of	a	bargained	compromise	that	mainly	reflects	
the bargaining power of the participating actors.37 
In	line	with	the	majority	of	IR	specialists,	we	would	not	claim	that	the	democratic	deficit	of	
transnational governance can be overcome entirely through the institutionalization of the three 
mechanisms in transnational PPPs. Nevertheless, we would argue that these mechanisms can 
foster the input legitimacy of transnational institutions (Wolf 2000: 213; Risse 2006).38 We would 
accordingly	reason	that	the	legitimacy	of	partnerships	–	just	as	their	effectiveness	–	depends	to	
a	significant	extent	on	their	institutional	design	(Keohane	00:	16;	Brühl/Liese	004:	185;	Beis-
heim et al. 2005). In the following, we survey the PPP literature along the dimensions of inclusi-
veness,	accountability,	and	deliberation,	and	present	the	empirical	findings	of	the	literature	in	
terms of the input legitimacy of transnational PPPs. 
4.2. Inclusiveness of transnational public-private partnerships
The	input	legitimacy	of	PPPs	can	be	advanced	if	 those	who	are	affected	by	a	collective	deci-
sion are formally included in the decision-making process, and if they actively give input into 
the	decision-making	process.	The	inclusiveness	of	partnerships	can	consequently	be	assessed	
along	the	two	dimensions	of	scope	and	quality	of	participation	(Dingwerth	007:	38).	In	terms	
of	scope,	we	found	two	main	findings	in	the	PPP	literature.	First,	affected	actors	are	by	tendency	
underrepresented in partnerships, though there are also counterexamples that have included a 
wide range of stakeholders. Second, a lack of resources may impede access to partnerships.
First,	Buse	and	Harmer’s	study	of	3	transnational	health	partnerships	reveals	that	these	part-
nerships	fail	to	provide	affected	actors	a	voice	in	their	decision-making	bodies	(Buse/Harmer	
007:	6).	Governments	of	developing	countries	are	poorly	represented	in	many	of	these	part-
nerships, the representation of publicly mandated organizations such as WHO is also limited, 
37 On deliberation, see Habermas (1992); Müller (1994); Elster (1998); Dryzek (1999); Risse (2000).
38 This implies that one has to accept a devaluation of traditional legitimacy concepts.
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and	NGOs	that	typically	claim	to	be	mandated	by	affected	actors	are	least	represented	in	the	
governing bodies. The corporate sector, on the contrary, has the greatest participation and is 
overrepresented,	which	is	in	disagreement	with	its	rather	modest	financial	contributions,	com-
pared to contributions of state actors and foundations.39 In short, Buse and Harmer point to an 
unbalanced representation, wherein the underrepresentation of southern actors is especially 
evident. Various other studies demonstrate that transnational partnerships have the tendency 
to replicate the imbalances of geographical representation encountered in intergovernmental 
forums, in which powerful northern actors dominate. In relation to the Type 2 partnerships 
launched at the WSSD, Hale and Mauzerall indicate that most partnership activity was driven 
by a handful of industrialized country governments, international organizations and northern 
NGOs, while governments from developing countries lead only a small percentage of the WSSD 
partnerships (Hale/Mauzerall 2004: 230).40 Additionally, the WSSD partnerships display a pro-
found lack of grassroots participation from developing countries, and this is exactly why Ando-
nova	and	Levy	conclude	that	the	Type		partnerships	reflect	the	capabilities	of	northern	actors	
but not the needs of developing countries (Andonova/Levy 2003: 19).41 In contrast to this, there 
are also examples of partnerships that have included a wide range of stakeholders and that have 
established	a	balanced	decision-making	system,	giving	northern	and	southern	actors	an	equal	
opportunity	to	participate.	The	Global	Fund	to	Fight	AIDS,	Tuberculosis	and	Malaria	(Global	
Fund)	is	based	on	a	balanced	system	in	which	developing	countries	and	NGOs	have	strong	for-
mal representation in its supreme governance body (Radelet 2004: 11; see also Buse 2004: 234). 
As we have already pointed out in section 3, the World Commission on Dams is also seen as a 
partnership that has ensured a broad participation (Khagram 1999: 8). With regard to the scope 
of	participation,	findings	are	therefore	mixed,	which	underlines	our	general	argument	that	the	
legitimacy of PPPs hinges to a certain extent on their institutional design.
Second, the literature shows that a lack of resources can prevent actors from participating in 
partnerships. One problem, highlighted in empirical studies, refers to the travel costs for mee-
tings, which in some cases must be borne by the home institution or the delegate him- or her-
self. In some partnerships, participation is also bound to membership fees, and even if NGOs 
can pay reduced fees, a grassroots level NGO from a developing country will be less able to 
afford	such	fees	than	powerful	northern	actors.	Both	aspects,	membership	fees	and	travel	costs,	
can lead to an imbalanced geographical representation (Andonova/Levy 2003: 26; Hale/Mauze-
rall	004:	3).	Partnerships	should	therefore	grant	more	financial	support	to	southern	actors	
to improve their participation in PPPs.  
39	Developing	countries	are	represented	with	an	average	of	17%	in	Buse	and	Harmer’s	sample.	The	per-
centages	of	international	organizations	and	NGOs	amount	to	7%	and	5%,	while	the	percentage	of	the	
corporate	sector	is	3%	(Buse/Harmer	007:	6).	
40	Only	 6%	 of	 these	 PPPs	 were	 initiated	 by	 governments	 of	 developing	 countries	 (Bäckstrand	 006:	
299).
41 It is worth mentioning that, in contrast to the health sector, the participation of corporations in the 
WSSD	partnerships	is	low.	Furthermore,	corporations	account	for	only	1%	of	the	financial	sources	of	
the	WSSD	PPPs	(Hale/Mauzerall	004:	31).	As	highlighted	by	Bäckstrand	(Bäckstrand	006:	99),	this	
empirical	finding	contradicts	 the	recurring	argument	that	partnerships	signify	 the	privatization	of	
world	politics	(Brühl	et	al.	001;	Brühl	007).
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Concerning	the	quality	of	participation,	it	has	to	be	highlighted	that	studies	that	carefully	track	
the	influence	of	the	different	stakeholders	on	governance	processes	are	hardly	available.	While	
it	 is	relatively	easy	to	assess	to	what	extent	the	different	groups	of	actors	are	formally	inclu-
ded	 in	 a	PPP,	 their	 concrete	 influence	on	decision-making	 is	harder	 to	determine.	 It	 is	 for	
this	reason	unclear	if,	 for	instance,	developing	countries	have	a	substantive	influence	within	
partnerships, or if – as claimed by some authors – powerful western donors and transnational 
corporations dominate the decision-making processes, while NGOs and southern countries are 
sidelined	in	partnerships	(Brühl	007:	156;	Zammit	003).	The	main	point	is	that	the	current	
evidence	 about	 the	quality	of	participation	 is	 anecdotal,	which	makes	 it	 impossible	 to	draw	
strong	conclusions	about	the	quality	of	participation.42 Apart from this general statement, we 
found	two	main	conclusions	in	the	literature.	The	first	aspect	relates	to	the	questions	of	who	is	
entitled	to	decide	about	inclusion	and	exclusion	of	stakeholders,	and	who	is	entitled	to	define	
stakeholder	categories.	As	Dingwerth’s	study	shows,	the	definition	of	stakeholder	categories	is	a	
contentious	step	that	is	often	based	on	elusive	processes	and	arbitrary	choices	(Dingwerth	007:	
126). In case of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), which aims at harmonizing the reporting 
on	non-financial	performance	of	organizations,	governments	were	not	identified	as	a	key	stake-
holder	category,	although	they	definitely	have	a	stake	in	this	issue.	Waddell	therefore	states	that	
governments	were	“purposefully	excluded”	from	GRI	(Waddell	00:	4),	a	statement	that	illus-
trates	the	significance	of	the	power	to	appoint	the	participating	stakeholders.	Moreover,	labor	
was accepted as a key stakeholder group in the GRI, and was accordingly able to obtain a strong 
position	in	the	PPP.	This	classification	of	labor	as	a	separate	stakeholder	group	is	considered	as	
surprising by studies, because labor groups are, in most PPPs, treated as part of the civil society 
constituency, yet in the case of the GRI, separate categories for labor and civil society were cre-
ated	(Dingwerth	007:	15).	This	strengthened	the	influence	of	labor	in	the	GRI,	which	in	turn	
caused	contentious	internal	debates.	Dingwerth	therefore	argues	that	“the	selection	and	defini-
tion	of	stakeholder	groups	is	based	on	deliberate	choices	that	have	far	reaching	consequences	
for	the	whole	decision-making	process	of	the	GRI”	(Dingwerth	007:	15;	Brühl	007:	156).	
With	regard	to	the	quality	of	participation,	a	second	factor	comes	into	view	that	can	hinder	an	
active participation, especially the participation of actors with weak resources, such as southern 
actors from developing countries. Even when southern actors are included in the governance 
bodies of transnational partnerships, their ability to participate substantially can be hampered 
by resource constraints. A small size of delegations, the inability to attend to all meetings, and 
a	frequent	rotation	among	delegates	can	impede	the	ability	to	influence	governance	processes.	
Language barriers can be another reason why representatives from the South are often far less 
active in board meetings of PPPs than their northern counterparts (Hale/Mauzerall 2004: 232; 
42	For	instance,	Brühl	argues	with	regard	to	the	Global	Compact	that	there	is	no	institutional	mechanism	
through	which	the	recommendations	of	NGOs	have	to	be	reflected.	While	the	process	 is	driven	by	
corporations,	NGOs	are	only	“junior	partners	at	best”	(Brühl	007:	153).	On	the	other	hand,	the	Global	
Fund	is	usually	seen	as	an	example	of	a	PPP	in	which	civil	society	actors	have	a	strong	voice	in	board	
meetings	 (Radelet	 004).	The	Global	 Fund	has	 also	 strongly	 supported	 the	production	of	 generics	
(Wulf 2004: 134), which contradicts the assumption by some critics that PPPs are a mere vehicle to 
promote business interests.
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Buse/Harmer	007:	63;	Raines	003:	6).	Consequently,	southern	representatives	can	have	pro-
blems	coping	with	the	plethora	of	information	and	the	complexity	of	topics	dealt	with.	Fur-
thermore, voting rights can be tied to particular institutional capacities. With regard to the 
ISO 14000 standards, which were created by the International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO) to boost environmental management systems in corporations, Clapp demonstrates that 
many developing countries have only observer status in the ISO because they lack the capacity 
needed for full voting rights (Clapp 1998). 
To	sum	up,	several	studies	point	out	that	affected	actors,	such	as	governments	from	developing	
countries, are underrepresented in partnerships. On the other hand, there are also counterex-
amples of PPPs that have included a wide range of stakeholders. Yet, resource constraints can 
hinder	 the	 scope,	 and,	 as	we	have	 shown,	 also	 the	quality	of	participation.	From	 this	 angle,	
powerful northern actors are in an advantageous position compared to resource-constrained 
southern	actors.	Although	we	lack	systematic	studies	that	analyze	the	quality	of	participation,	
it seems reasonable to argue that northern actors have the greater potential for a substantive 
participation. This result points to the fact that PPPs have the tendency to replicate the imba-
lances of geographical representation encountered in intergovernmental arenas (Reinicke et al. 
000:	77).	
4.3. Accountability of transnational public-private partnerships
Including private actors in collective decision-making constitutes a problem for the legitimacy 
of	global	governance	in	the	first	place,	as	these	actors	are	not	legitimized	through	elections.	
While NGOs may, to a certain extent, legitimately claim that they represent public interests, the 
situation	is	made	even	more	complicated	when	for-profit	actors	such	as	transnational	compa-
nies	are	included,	because	they	are	primarily	driven	by	profit-seeking	motives	and	possess	a	
strong bargaining power.43 In this context, external and internal accountability mechanisms are 
debated as a second way to increase the input legitimacy of transnational partnerships. How-
ever, as we have already pointed out, from a normative angle, external accountability mecha-
nisms matter most, as they assure that decision-making actors act according to the interests of 
those	who	are	affected	by	a	decision	(Keohane	006:	79,	Benner	et	al.	005).
A critical precondition for external and internal accountability is transparency, since decision-
making actors can only be held accountable if accurate information on the governance process 
is	available	(Steets	005:	1).	If	transparency	is	absent,	partnerships	can	“create	the	illusion	of	
progress, giving corporations and governments positive publicity without resulting in concrete 
steps toward sustainable development” (Hale/Mauzerall 2004: 226). Empirical studies reveal 
mixed results on the transparency of partnerships. Various studies criticize the WSSD part-
nerships for their weak transparency because less than a third of them have a website and an 
43	See	Beisheim	(005)	on	the	crucial	question	to	what	extent	NGOs	are	legitimate	actors	of	global	gover-
nance. 
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 6 • August 2007 |  29
institutionalized reporting mechanism to inform the stakeholders. Barely 50 percent have an 
internal	monitoring	to	track	their	progress	(Hale/Mauzerall	004:	7).	Although	the	Commis-
sion on Sustainable Development has stressed the need to monitor the progress of the WSSD 
partnerships, monitoring is still voluntary, and only 20 percent of the WSSD partnerships have 
provided	progress	reports	to	the	Commission	(Andonova/Levy	003:	;	Bäckstrand	006:	300).	
Yet	there	are	also	counterexamples	of	very	transparent	partnerships.	The	Global	Fund	and	the	
GRI	are	generally	viewed	as	highly	transparent	(Radelet	004:	8;	Dingwerth	007:	133).	The	Glo-
bal	Fund,	for	example,	has	committed	itself	to	high	transparency	standards	in	its	grant	making	
and	financial	disbursements,	and	has	also	institutionalized	instruments	to	disseminate	most	of	
the	other	relevant	information,	including	minutes	of	board	meetings	(Lu	et	al.	006b:	487).	
Though critical to achieve accountability, the contribution of transparency for controlling the 
actions of the decision-making actors in PPPs should not be exaggerated. At the end of the day, 
the	ability	of	the	affected	actors	to	hold	the	supreme	governance	body	of	a	PPP	accountable	is	
the most striking factor for generating external accountability. While there are partnerships, 
such	as	the	Global	Fund	and	the	Global	Reporting	Initiative,	that	have	institutionalized	stake-
holder forums, which include a wide range of actors, all these forums lack the power to hold 
the supreme governance bodies accountable. To demonstrate this, the degree of external ac-
countability institutionalized in the Global Reporting Initiative is high compared to most other 
partnerships because its stakeholder council can even elect the supreme governance body, and 
is therefore able to exert some control on the general direction of the PPP. Yet the stakeholder 
council	lacks	the	authority	to	directly	influence	the	decision-making	of	the	board	(Dingwerth	
007:	131).	As	the	external	accountability	standard	of	the	Global	Reporting	Initiative	is	relatively	
high,	the	current	findings	suggest	that	partnerships	demonstrate	a	potential	to	exhibit	external	
accountability, but that strong formal accountability mechanisms are absent in PPPs.  
Apart	from	such	formal	means,	empirical	studies	point	to	the	significance	of	informal	accoun-
tability mechanisms to control decision-makers in partnerships. As demonstrated in some stu-
dies,	the	participation	of	specific	actors	can	be	so	critical	for	the	success	of	a	partnership	that	
these actors retain power in decision-making processes through their ability to threaten the re-
vocation of their support when their interests are ignored. In the case of the Global Alliance for 
Workers	and	Communities,	scholars	argue	that	the	inclusion	of	a	specific	NGO	was	important	
for this CSR partnership because the respective NGO was seen as a credible actor that granted 
legitimacy to the partnership (Radovich 2006). The withdrawal of the NGO could have put the 
whole	partnership	at	risk.	Thus,	scholars	argue	that	this	NGO	had	a	relatively	effective	informal	
accountability mechanism at its disposal (Radovich 2006).  
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4.4. Deliberation in transnational public-private partnerships
The concept of deliberative democracy is increasingly debated as a model to improve the input 
legitimacy of inter- and transnational governance.44 One theoretical argument in relation to 
such ‘arguing’ processes in transnational partnerships is that the network nature of partner-
ships	can	give	ample	room	for	arguing.	“Nonhierarchical	and	networklike	international	institu-
tions characterized by a high density of mostly informal interactions should provide the struc-
tural conditions in international relations to allow for discursive and argumentative processes” 
(Risse 2000: 15). Although a lively theoretical and empirical debate on deliberative democracy 
goes on, empirical studies that analyze the validity of the above mentioned theoretical notion 
about the conduciveness of partnerships for arguing are rare. An exception is a number of 
studies on the World Commission on Dams that show that a high degree of deliberation has 
taken	place	in	the	Commission,	the	supreme	governance	body	of	the	WCD	(Dingwerth	007:	88;	
Brinkerhoff	00:	198).	On	the	question	under	which	conditions	the	mode	of	arguing	instead	
of	bargaining	becomes	the	dominant	mode	of	communication,	the	studies	confirm	findings	
that research on intergovernmental negotiations has revealed (Checkel 2001: 536). Institutio-
nalized small-sized meetings behind closed doors have favored arguing and were crucial in 
the	consensus-building	process	of	 the	WCD	 (Dingwerth	007:	90).	Another	 factor	said	 to	be	
conducive for arguing is strong leadership of credible actors that are perceived as impartial and 
dedicated to a cause (Ulbert/Risse 2005: 358). Scholars point out that the WCD Chairman Asmal 
has played a critical role for consensus-building, because Asmal has exerted strong leadership 
combining	credibility	with	competence	and	decisiveness	(Dingwerth	007:	88).	It	is	noteworthy	
that there are tensions between inclusiveness and transparency on the one hand, and delibera-
tion on the other. As in the case of the WCD, closed settings, in which hand-selected actors can 
freely exchange arguments and are able to change their preferences more easily than in public 
discourses, contradict inclusiveness and transparency standards. This aspect illuminates the 
problem of legitimacy in transnational governance. All in all, the core outcome of this section 
is that research has only started to explore arguing processes in PPPs. Generally speaking, it is 
unclear	if	PPPs	are	conducive	for	arguing;	it	might	as	well	be	possible	that	difficulties	arise	for	
finding	a	reasoned	consensus	when	highly	antagonistic	actors,	such	as	NGOs	and	TNCs,	meet	
each other in PPPs. 
44 See Müller (1994); Wolf (2000); Risse (2000; 2006). 
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5. Conclusion: Transnational public-private partnerships in world politics
In this article, we set out to present an overview of the contemporary research program on 
transnational	partnerships.	Their	proliferation	expresses	the	contemporary	reconfiguration	of	
authority	in	world	politics,	which	poses	essential	questions	on	the	legitimacy	and	the	effective-
ness of global governance. As indicated in our overview, the research program on transnational 
partnerships is still at an early stage. Currently, we lack theoretically informed studies that cast 
light on the conditions under which partnerships emerge, and under which conditions they 
are	effective	and	legitimate	governance	tools.	As	much	work	on	partnerships	suffers	from	in-
sufficient	research	designs,	generalizations	remain	problematic.	More	comparative	research	is	
imperative to attain conclusive evidence about partnerships, and as PPP research is, at present, 
theoretically rather under-informed, IR theories provide the analytical frameworks necessary to 
conduct hypothesis-testing studies. 
With regard to the emergence of PPPs, we have pointed out that the popular functional argu-
ment – changing structures lead to widening governance gaps that create a functional demand 
for partnerships – has been contested by empirical studies. Another popular approach explains 
the formation of PPPs with reference to incentives, arguing that the self-interest of actors to 
gain additional resources is a major driver for their formation. In this context, we pointed out 
that	research	on	transnational	partnerships	can	benefit	from	studies	on	national	PPPs	that	have	
applied institutional economics to indicate what kind of incentives work on the micro-level. 
Concerning	effectiveness	and	legitimacy,	we	have	highlighted	the	importance	of	 the	institu-
tional	design	on	the	effectiveness	and	legitimacy	of	transnational	partnerships.	Regarding	the	
effectiveness	of	partnerships,	we	have	shown	that	it	 is	currently	unclear	if	a	broad	inclusion	
of	 stakeholders	 fosters	 effective	 policy	 formulation,	 or	 instead	 leads	 to	 lowest	 common	de-
nominator solutions. With regard to policy implementation, we have demonstrated on CSR 
promoting partnerships that authors underline the relevance of the institutional design for 
the implementation of norms and policies but disagree about the design features best suited to 
fulfill	this	task	effectively.	IR	theories,	such	as	the	compliance	theories	introduced	above,	can	
be	fruitfully	applied	in	order	to	examine	the	conditions	under	which	partnerships	are	effective	
governance instruments. As stressed in the course of the article, these conditions are currently 
rather	unclear.	Furthermore,	 future	research	should	not	only	examine	if	single	partnerships	
achieve	their	objectives	–	a	concept	of	effectiveness	that	we	have	labeled	simple	performance	
–	but	should	keep	an	eye	on	the	unintended	side-effects	of	partnerships	as	well.	This	problem	
is captured through the broader concept of complex performance. As the review has shown, 
partnerships	can	possibly	have	serious	unintended	side-effects,	such	as	the	fragmentation	of	
global politics that could challenge the authority of state actors and may even distort the poli-
cies of state actors. In other words, although partnerships can score highly with regard to their 
simple	performance,	unintended	side-effects	can	possibly	offset	their	achievements	and	hinder	
the	efforts	of	state	actors	to	tackle	global	challenges.	This	should	be	kept	in	view.	
Concerning the legitimacy of partnerships, we have surveyed the PPP literature along the three 
dimensions of inclusiveness, accountability and deliberativeness. With regard to inclusiveness, 
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studies	reveal	that	affected	actors	tend	to	be	underrepresented	in	partnerships.	While	there	are	
definitely	 counterexamples	 of	 very	 inclusive	PPPs,	 transnational	 partnerships	 tend	 to	 repli-
cate the geographical imbalances known from intergovernmental arenas. Studies also clarify 
that partnerships lack strong accountability mechanisms to hold power-wielders accountable. 
Mechanisms	through	which	affected	actors	can	control	the	decision-making	in	the	supreme	
governance bodies of PPPs are largely absent. As we have demonstrated with the Global Repor-
ting Initiative, partnerships currently at best reveal a potential for strong accountability means. 
Finally,	 relating	 to	 the	deliberation	processes	within	PPPs,	 our	overview	has	 shown	 that	 re-
search has only started to examine the conduciveness of partnerships for deliberation, and that 
much more empirical work is necessary to draw any strong conclusions. Generally, two aspects 
in	our	view	are	crucial	for	further	research	on	partnerships.	First,	the	standards	of	comparison	
for transnational partnerships should not be ideal-types of political institutions that are highly 
effective	and	legitimate,	but	rather	interstate	regimes,	which	in	many	instances	do	not	perform	
perfectly.	Second,	questions	about	the	legitimacy	and	effectiveness	cannot	be	judged	in	general	
terms;	the	problem-solving	and	legitimate	quality	of	transnational	partnerships	rather	depends	
on their individual institutional set-up. 
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